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Grand Theory or Discrete Proposal? 
Religious Accommodations and Health 
Related Harms 
James M. Oleske, Jr.* 
Abstract 
More than a quarter-century has passed since the Supreme 
Court decided in Employment Division v. Smith that religious 
accommodations are primarily a matter of legislative grace, not 
constitutional right. In that time, barrels of ink have been spilled 
over the merits of the Smith decision. But comparatively little 
attention has been given to the issue of how legislatures and other 
political actors should exercise their discretion to grant or deny 
specific religious accommodations. In their article To 
Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the State 
Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and Third 
Parties?, Professor Hillel Levin, Dr. Allan Jacobs, and Dr. Kavita 
Arora aim to fill that critical gap. They propose a specific 
methodology for political actors to use in considering requests for 
religious exemptions—with the goal of bringing more consistency 
to the accommodation project—and their proposal has much to 
recommend it. This Response argues, however, that the Authors’ 
argument for their proposal suffers by trying to do too much. 
Instead of offering their proposal solely as a prudential tool for 
policymakers, they also frame it as a constitutional tool that 
judges can use to enforce the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. As detailed in this Response, the Authors’ effort to 
have their proposal serve this second function runs into serious 
problems that can only distract from their primary mission. 
Accordingly, this Response suggests that the Authors refocus 
                                                                                                     
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I am very 
grateful to the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for their 
invitation to participate in this discussion and to Hillel Levin for his thoughtful 
comments on an earlier draft of this Response.    
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exclusively on that primary mission in future efforts to advance 
their proposal and offers a few suggestions for how the Authors 
might seek to operationalize their test in the political realm. 
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I. Introduction 
The law governing religious accommodations in the United 
States is currently “a confusing and rather ragtag body of law.”1 
After nearly three decades of reading the Free Exercise Clause to 
provide a floor of required accommodation,2 the Supreme Court 
reversed course in 1990, holding in Employment Division v. 
Smith3 that the Constitution does not provide a right to religious 
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws.4 
Congress then passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 (RFRA)5 in an effort to reinstitute the pre-Smith landscape,6 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 839, 845 (2014). 
 2.  See Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 144 
(1987) (requiring accommodation from unemployment compensation rule and 
explaining that the government “sometimes must . . . accommodate religious 
practices”); see generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (requiring 
accommodation from compulsory education law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) (requiring accommodation from rule requiring unemployment 
compensation beneficiaries to be available to work on Saturday). 
 3.  494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 4.  Id. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of 
the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on 
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 5.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb-4 (2012). 
 6.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513–16 (discussing the 
historical backdrop of RFRA). 
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but the Court held in 1997 that RFRA is invalid as applied to the 
states.7 RFRA still provides a presumptive right to religious 
exemptions from federal law, but the precise strength of that 
presumption is unclear.8 Meanwhile, twenty-one states have 
enacted their own RFRAs,9 most of which have not been enforced 
as vigorously as their proponents might have hoped;10 twelve 
states without RFRAs have constitutional provisions that courts 
have interpreted to provide more protection than Smith;11 four 
states without RFRAs have interpreted their constitutions to 
embody the Smith rule;12 and the law is unclear in the rest of the 
states. On top of all that, the seemingly bright-line constitutional 
rule in Smith is not actually so bright. Lower courts have taken 
vastly different approaches in determining whether a law is too 
underinclusive to qualify as “generally applicable” for purposes of 
Smith,13 and the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue in a 
case not involving obvious gerrymandering.14  
But wait, there’s more!  
                                                                                                     
 7.  See id. at 511, 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital 
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”). 
 8.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 n.3 
(2014) (“On [one] understanding of our pre-Smith cases, RFRA did more than 
merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of cases; it provided 
even broader protection for religious liberty than was available under those 
decisions.”). But see id. at 2767 n.18 (finding it unnecessary to resolve this issue 
definitively). 
 9.  See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NCSL (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2016) (providing a list of state equivalents to RFRA) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 10.  See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at 
State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466, 485 (2010) (surveying cases and concluding 
that “[c]ourts often interpret state RFRAs in an incredibly watered down 
manner”). 
 11.  See Laycock, supra, note 1, at 844 n.22 (citing cases).  
 12.  See id. at 844 n.23 (citing cases).  
 13.  See James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty 
for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. 295, 306–14 
(2013) (discussing the lower court decisions).  
 14.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 535 (1993) (finding that a city had enacted ordinances constituting a 
religious gerrymander targeting the ritual animal sacrifices of a Santeria 
church).  
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In addition to creating general exemption rights with RFRAs, 
legislatures have enacted thousands of issue-specific religious 
accommodations.15 And whether an accommodation is made 
pursuant to a RFRA or a specific statutory forbearance, an 
Establishment Clause objection could be raised to the 
accommodation. Although the Court has held that religious 
exemptions “need not ‘come packaged with benefits to secular 
entities’” in all cases,16 it has struck down exemptions that do not 
appropriately balance their benefits with the costs they impose on 
third parties.17 Where exactly that balance should be struck is the 
subject of intense disagreement.18  
Into this breach step Professor Hillel Levin, Dr. Allan Jacobs, 
and Dr. Kavita Arora (the Authors) with their ambitious and 
illuminating new article, To Accommodate or Not to 
Accommodate: (When) Should the State Regulate Religion to 
Protect the Rights of Children and Third Parties.19 In it, the 
Authors focus on a specific challenge—situations in which a 
religious exemption may “impose risks, burdens, or costs on 
children”20—to develop a test aimed at bringing more principle 
and greater consistency to the accommodation project.21 From the 
outset, the authors note that “although the test was developed 
                                                                                                     
 15.  See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445–46 (1992) 
(reporting over 2,000 such accommodations). 
 16.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005). 
 17.  See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) 
(striking down a statute that “command[ed] that Sabbath religious concerns 
automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace,” and noting 
that “the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the 
employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath”); see also 
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 710 (“An accommodation must be measured so that it does 
not override other significant interests.”). 
 18.  Compare Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and 
Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39 (2014) (reading the 
establishment bar narrowly), with Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van 
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An 
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 343 
(2014) (reading the establishment bar broadly). See Levin, Jacobs & Arora, infra 
note 19, at 969 & n.262 (noting the uncertainty about when an accommodation 
violates the Establishment Clause). 
 19.  72 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 915 (2016).  
 20.  Id. at 917. 
 21.  Id. at 920, 966, 968.  
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specifically to address religious practices that may impose health 
related harms to children and third-parties, it also has potential 
implications in other contexts as well.”22 The Article ends by 
addressing the import and challenges of “accommodationism” 
writ large, with the full sweep of the Authors’ proposal on 
display: 
Our test is a step forward in that it offers a consistent and 
principled approach to [accommodation] questions that does 
not simply leave them to the interest group dynamics of the 
political marketplace. Instead, the test balances the needs of 
the state and those of religious people by simultaneously 
acknowledging the state’s need to protect itself and its citizens 
from religious practices that impose costs on others, while also 
respecting the values of pluralism. It also incorporates and 
respects constitutional church-state doctrines and suggests a 
way to resolve abiding tensions between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment clauses. Finally, the test can serve as a valuable 
tool for different kinds of decision makers—legislators, 
administrative officials, judges, and clinicians—and is 
sensitive to the relative institutional strengths and weaknesses 
of each.23 
As the italicized sentences at the end of that passage make 
clear, this is no small proposal. It offers reconciliation of the 
Religion Clauses, a topic which itself has spawned several grand 
theories,24 as well as the promise of a test that can transcend 
branches of government and even inform private-sector decisions. 
That said, the Authors’ central focus in developing and applying 
their test is on “legislators and other policymakers.”25 
Accommodation decisions made by the political branches, the 
Authors explain, are “often unmoored from consideration of 
underlying values”26 and driven by the dynamics of interest-group 
                                                                                                     
 22.  Id. at 916. 
 23.  Id. at 1016 (emphasis added). 
 24.  See generally Eric J. Segall, Doctrinal Legal Scholarship and Religious 
Liberty: A Review of Jesse Choper’s Securing Religious Liberty, 5 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 71, 77 (1996) (referring to the various “prominent grand theories 
purporting to explain the Religion Clauses” that Professor Choper identified in 
his book before offering his own theory).  
 25.  Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 968. 
 26.  Id. at 952; see id. at 950–51  
[M]any of our laws seem to lack any principled balancing at all. That 
is, there seem to be no principles at play in the degree to which we 
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politics.27 Finding this state of affairs “deeply troubling,”28 the 
Authors offer a test that is aimed at channeling policymakers’ 
accommodation decisions into a principled balancing of competing 
interests.29 
The challenge facing the Authors would be daunting enough 
if they kept their focus exclusively on the policymaking process 
and offered a reform proposal designed to “impose consistency on 
the accommodation and non-accommodation of religious practices 
that may harm children and third parties.”30 Their task only 
becomes more overwhelming, however, by including a 
simultaneous effort to provide judges with a “tool for making 
constitutional determinations as to whether the legal treatment 
of a religious practice violates the Free Exercise Clause or the 
Establishment Clause.”31 The Authors attempt to pursue both of 
these ambitious goals with a unified test, and the natural 
question that this decision prompts is whether they are trying to 
do too much. The answer, I fear, is “yes.” As discussed in Part II 
of this Response, the current constitutional landscape—which the 
Authors accept in making their proposal—causes considerable 
problems for their proposal as a constitutional tool. Those 
problems, however, do not cast doubt on the suitability of the 
Authors’ test for the task of improving non-judicial 
accommodations, which is clearly their core goal. Accordingly, 
Part III of this Response offers some suggestions for how the 
Authors might advance that goal by pursuing a strategy of more 
discrete reforms.  
                                                                                                     
permit or limit religious freedom in individual cases. Sometimes we 
allow religious groups to impose significant costs and harms on third 
parties . . . . On the other hand, sometimes statutes or regulations 
prohibit the exercise of religious freedom even where there is little or 
no harm to anyone. 
 27.  See id. at 961 (“In short, religious groups operate in the political 
marketplace like other interest groups. As such, whether they win or lose on a 
particular political issue is related less to a principled balancing of the 
competing underlying values than it is to the political dynamics in play.”). 
 28.  Id. at 961. 
 29.  See id. at 966–71 (reciting and explaining the test). 
 30.  Id. at 968. 
 31.  Id. at 970.  
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II. The Dangers of Going Big 
In the pages leading up to the announcement of their 
proposed test, the Authors reassure readers that “our project is 
not to re-litigate the merits of Smith.”32 That decision, they 
conclude, “is unlikely to be reversed in the near to intermediate 
term, and a serious discussion of religious accommodations must 
accept a legal regime in which Smith is good law.”33 Yet, in the 
very next paragraph, the Authors justify their proposal with 
reference to a constitutional understanding that runs directly 
contrary to Smith. Specifically, in discussing how their proposal 
will vindicate free exercise values, they write: “to the degree that 
different religious groups may receive different treatment from 
legislatures as a result of the political power of the groups, 
constitutional questions arise.”34 Smith, however, taught that 
while it “may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the 
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those 
religious practices that are not widely engaged in,” that was an 
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government” that did not 
offend the Constitution.35 In light of that teaching, when the 
Authors proceed to discuss how “competing constitutional values 
demand careful and principled balancing,”36 and how their test 
“balances the competing interests . . . according to the yin and 
yang of the First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses,”37 they are including a “yin” that does not appear to exist 
under Smith.  
                                                                                                     
 32.  Id. at 964.  
 33.  Id. I am not as convinced as the Authors that the near-to-intermediate-
term prospects for overturning Smith are quite so bleak. See James M. Oleske, 
Jr., A Regrettable Invitation to “Constitutional Resistance,” Renewed Confusion 
over Religious Exemptions, and the Future of Free Exercise, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 38–39 & n.197), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2837392 (discussing recent indications that some 
justices may be newly open to reconsidering Smith).  
 34.  Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 964–65. Notably, the case the 
Authors cite for this proposition concerns RFRA, not the Free Exercise Clause. 
See id. at 965 n.245 (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2006)). 
 35.  Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 890 (1990). 
 36.  Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 965. 
 37.  Id. at 966. 
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A passage from earlier in the Article nicely illustrates how 
much broader than Smith the Authors assume the protections of 
the Free Exercise Clause might extend:   
“[L]awmakers sometimes reject requested religious 
accommodations and restrict religious practices for a variety of 
other reasons: animus, mistrust, indifference, lack of 
awareness, political self-interest, and so forth. . . . Lawmakers 
violate the Constitution when they attempt to impose 
restrictions on religious practices for some or all of these 
reasons.”38 
While the Smith Court’s view of the Free Exercise Clause 
would protect against denials of accommodation for the first 
reason (animus) and possibly the second (mistrust, assuming it is 
of religion and not of exemptions generally), the Smith view is not 
generally implicated by failures to accommodate due to 
indifference, lack of awareness, or political self-interest. Indeed, 
those reasons are precisely why minority religions are presumed 
to do worse in the political process, which was a result the Smith 
Court explicitly acknowledged and accepted.39 
In sum, insofar as the Authors maintain that their test 
“protects Free Exercise interests” by “prevent[ing] restriction of 
                                                                                                     
 38.  Id. at 945–46.  
 39.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text (quoting Smith). It bears 
noting that one of the Authors has previously challenged the presumption 
mentioned in the text and argued that accommodation might be better handled 
in the political process than in the courts. See Hillel Y. Levin, Rethinking 
Religious Minorities’ Political Power, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1617, 1681 (2015)  
[R]eligious groups have more potency in the majoritarian branches 
than is often understood as a result of their ability to work together 
and with others within the political system. . . . [C]ourts’ institutional 
structure gives them no special expertise on religious liberty 
questions. . . . In combination, these dynamics undermine arguments 
in favor of special judicial consideration for religious minority groups 
in the normal course of affairs.  
But see Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 172–73 (2016)  
If we rely exclusively on legislatures to address these issues and 
resolve them in advance through particularized religious exemptions 
passed in the normal legislative process, we will find ourselves sorely 
frustrated. The situation will end up resembling the South Pacific—
an archipelago of religious exemptions in a wide ocean of religious 
need. 
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religious practices on frivolous grounds,”40 their test embodies a 
view of the Free Exercise Clause that departs from Smith. I 
happen to agree with the Authors’ view, which is why I argue 
elsewhere that the Court should reconsider Smith,41 but our 
shared view cannot be said to represent current law. 
The second complication the Authors encounter by tying 
their test to the Constitution and treating it as a tool for the 
judiciary as well as policymakers concerns the “Magnitude” prong 
of their test. Before turning to that prong, however, this would be 
a good time to review all three main provisions of the Authors’ 
test. The first prong, the “Bases for Possible Restriction” prong, 
establishes what the Authors describe as “a default rule that 
religious practices should be respected unless they unduly 
interfere with the real and measurable interests of children 
within the religion and others outside the religious group.”42 The 
second prong, the “Likelihood of Effect,” provides that 
government should only deny an accommodation to a religious 
practice if its adverse impact on others is “actual” and “likely,” 
rather than “merely hypothetical.”43 That brings us to the 
“Magnitude of Effect,” the final component of the Authors’ test, 
and the one of immediate concern here. It provides: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if society tolerates 
harms from comparable mainstream practices that impose 
harms of a similar magnitude to the harms posed by the 
religious practice at issue, then it should not restrict that 
religious practice. Conversely, if a mainstream practice that 
imposes severe harms is forbidden, then a comparable 
religious practice that imposes harms of a similar magnitude 
should likewise not be tolerated. Legislatures should be 
mindful of this provision when considering religious 
accommodations, and courts should be active in enforcing it.44 
                                                                                                     
 40.  Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 970. 
 41.  See Oleske, supra note 33, at 39–56 (arguing that the Court should 
apply modestly heightened scrutiny when a generally applicable law 
incidentally burdens religion and should require the government to show that it 
has more than a de minimis interest in denying a religious accommodation). 
 42.  Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 968. 
 43.  Id. at 967. 
 44.  Id.  
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The Authors’ lead explanation of the Magnitude prong is that 
it “captures the Supreme Court’s admonition in [Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah45] that society may not 
target religious practices for censure when it permits comparable 
mainstream practices, thus enforcing Free Exercise 
boundaries.”46 The problem is that neither the language of the 
Authors’ Magnitude prong, nor its application elsewhere in the 
Article, is limited to laws that “target religious practices for 
censure.” Indeed, some passages in the Article could be read as 
supporting the far-reaching argument that a religious exemption 
must be made any time a law includes even a single comparable 
secular exemption, even if the law still applies to a multitude of 
other secular practices that are comparable to the religious 
practice.47 Given that most laws include some exemptions, 
interpreting Lukumi this broadly would threaten to swallow 
Smith, which is one of many reasons the broad interpretation has 
been the subject of intense skepticism in free exercise 
scholarship.48 The Authors do not engage that scholarship, but 
                                                                                                     
 45.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 46.  Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 969. See id. at 970 (“The 
Magnitude prong, as noted, tracks Lukumi, in precluding pretextual laws that 
functionally, but not explicitly, single out religious practices for restriction.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 47.  See id. at 1011 n.497 (describing the Magnitude prong as “proposing 
that a religious practice not be restricted if a comparative and commonly 
practiced secular activity exists”); id. at 1012 n. 504 (explaining that “where a 
religious practice has a comparable mainstream practice [that is permitted], 
policymakers should not restrict the religious practice”); see also id. at 989–90 
(“If society tolerates the risk for the comparable mainstream practice . . . it must 
treat the religious practice comparably.”); id. at 1002 n.449 (explaining that 
“religious practices may be regulated when their direct or indirect effects are 
severe as long as there is no comparable secular practice accepted by society”) 
(emphasis added).  
 48.  See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False 
Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 
194–203 (2002) (arguing that there are “too many conceptual and practical 
problems with the [secular-exemption-requires-religious-exemption view] for it 
to be accepted”); Oleske, supra note 13, at 298–301, 326-31 (arguing that “a 
broad selective-exemption rule that goes beyond situations suggesting 
discriminatory intent cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's current 
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause”); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law 
Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1539–42 (1999) 
(providing several reasons for rejecting the secular-exemption-requires-
religious-exemption interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause); Colin A. 
Devine, Comment, A Critique of the Secular Exceptions Approach to Religious 
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doing so might give them pause about the “lodestar” role they 
assert the Magnitude prong can play in judicial administration of 
their test.49 
The final difficulty with treating the Authors’ test as a 
constitutional tool concerns the issue of consistency. At times, the 
Authors indicate that while they do intend their test to provide 
more consistency in reasoning by policymakers, it will not require 
consistency of results. As the Authors write at one point late in 
their article:  
With respect to our test, reasonable people may reasonably 
disagree about the magnitude of the risks associated with a 
particular religious practice. Some policymakers will consider 
certain costs tolerable, while others will find the same costs 
intolerable. Consequently, they may disagree as to how to 
treat the religious practice under the first prong of the test. . . . 
[T]erms in the first prong like “unreasonable burdens,” 
“sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,” and 
                                                                                                     
Exemptions, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1348 (2015) (same). But see Douglas Laycock & 
Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law & The Free Exercise of Religion, 95 
NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2784336 
(advocating for the secular-exemption-requires-religious-exemption view). The 
premise of Professor Laycock and Mr. Collis’s argument—that Smith and 
Lukumi are best read to mean that the Free Exercise Clause protects against 
more than the danger of intentional discrimination—is difficult to square with 
the Court’s own post-Lukumi description of its free exercise jurisprudence. See 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (describing “the free exercise 
of religion as defined by Smith” as freedom from “laws which are enacted with 
the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practice”); id. at 531 
(identifying the baseline for what constitutes a free exercise violation as 
“legislation enacted due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious 
practice”); id. at 534 (explaining that RFRA did not match the Free Exercise 
Clause because it would affect laws “without regard to whether they had the 
object of stifling or punishing free exercise”).     
 49.  Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 968. Professor Levin did 
address the breadth of Lukumi in an earlier article, observing that “[i]t can be 
difficult to determine whether a decision not to accommodate religious practices 
and beliefs should be classified as a Smith-type case . . . or a Lukumi-type case.” 
Levin, supra note 39, at 1672. Given that the Levin, Jacobs & Arora article 
never explicitly addresses the issue of how broadly Lukumi should be 
interpreted, one could read the Authors as trying to remain agnostic on this 
hotly disputed question. Abstaining from that question would not necessarily be 
a problem if the Authors were proposing their test solely as a prudential tool for 
policymakers. But such abstention does seem problematic when the Authors are 
also framing their test as a “tool for making constitutional determinations,” with 
a Magnitude prong that they assert “tracks Lukumi” and that “courts should be 
active in enforcing.” Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 967, 970.  
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“objectively severe” require the application of judgment, and 
people’s judgment may differ in different cases. But this lack 
of certitude is not something that should concern us any more 
than it does in the case of any other legal test.50  
The final sentence in this passage is in considerable tension 
with the rationale the Authors provide earlier for offering their 
test in the first place. In that earlier discussion, the Authors 
highlight the current inconsistency surrounding religious 
accommodations, and they set up and then knock down the very 
“should not concern us” rationale they rely upon in the passage 
above. Here is the key passage from the earlier discussion:  
We can ask why, given that the vast majority of our laws are 
produced through the very same political dynamic as we have 
identified in this context, and therefore display similar 
inconsistencies and pathologies throughout the law, we should 
be especially wary of this dynamic in the context of religious 
accommodationism.51  
The answer the Authors give to this question is that both 
under- and over-accommodation in the political process 
implicates “constitutional values” that “demand careful and 
principled balancing and consistent resolution on the part of 
policymakers and judges confronting these cases.”52 Demanding 
consistent resolution makes sense if the Authors are dealing with 
a constitutional issue and not just a prudential one. But by the 
end of the Article, the Authors appear to be taking a very 
different tack when they argue that readers should not be 
concerned about different decisionmakers reaching different 
conclusions as to whether a particular religious practice should 
be accommodated. 
In the end, the Authors’ decision to frame their proposal as a 
constitutional tool leads to more questions than answers. That 
need not be fatal, however, for the underlying test, which could 
well serve as a helpful tool for better policymaking in the 
accommodation area.     
                                                                                                     
 50.  Id. at 1010. 
 51.  Id. at 962. 
 52.  Id. at 965 (emphasis added).   
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III. Suggestions for Starting Small 
As noted above, even if the Authors narrowed the scope of 
their project to the goal of making legislative and administrative 
accommodation decisions more principled and consistent, it would 
still be a very tall order. The biggest outstanding question is how 
to operationalize the Authors’ test in the political realm, where, 
unlike the judicial realm, decisions are rarely bound by subject-
specific tests and precedents. As the Authors consider how to 
overcome this challenge, and convince policymakers to subject 
themselves to the test, I would offer a few suggestions for discrete 
starting points.    
The first mechanism that comes to mind is executive orders, 
whether presidential or gubernatorial, which could be used to 
advance the test in the regulatory realm. A second mechanism 
that might be worth considering is whether the elements of the 
test—or, more accurately, legislative evidence relevant to those 
elements—could be incorporated into official bill summaries done 
by nonpartisan legislative staff. If information about the asserted 
costs and benefits of accommodations were systematically 
presented to legislators along with fiscal summaries and revenue 
impact statements, perhaps they would become accustomed to 
utilizing the test in their decisions (though it still would not be 
binding in any real sense). The third mechanism that comes to 
mind is drafting model legislation specifically designed to guide 
accommodation decisions by the political branches. My final 
thought on how best to operationalize the Authors’ test is to ask: 
Has anything like this ever been done before? If precedent exists 
for reforming legislative decisionmaking on a specific issue to 
address perceived systematic shortcomings, that precedent would 
be well worth studying.  
IV. Conclusion 
Using the issue of health-related harm as a catalyst, the 
Authors have initiated a critical conversation about how 
policymakers should discern the appropriate limits of religious 
accommodation. The Authors come to the conversation armed 
with a concrete proposal aimed at delivering more principled and 
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consistent decisions on accommodations, and the proposal has 
much to recommend it. This Response has suggested, however, 
that the proposal suffers by trying to do too much. By going 
beyond the issue of improving accommodation decisions in the 
political realm, and trying to have their proposal do double duty 
as a constitutional tool, the Authors invite thorny questions that 
can only distract from their primary mission. Accordingly, this 
Response suggests that the most promising path forward for the 
proposal would be to divorce it from larger efforts to achieve free 
exercise/establishment reconciliation and focus on finding 
discrete ways to advance it as a good government measure.  
